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Abstract
Previous public opinion studies argued that in the Arab Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Muslim
citizens support gender equality less than non-Muslims, due to Islamic-patriarchal socialization.
Deviating from this Orientalist narrative, we formulate a context-dependent agentic-socialization
framework, which acknowledges religiosity’s and gender equality’s multidimensionality along with
the MENA’s political-institutional diversity. We expect that religious service attendance and devotion
decrease support for gender equality in politics but not in education. Moreover, we theorize that open
political structures allow citizens to express agency and dissociate from dominant patriarchal pat-
terns. We test these expectations using WVS and AB data covering 50,000 respondents in 39 MENA
country-years. Our results show religious service attendance indeed reduces support for gender
equality. However, more devoted citizens support gender equality in education more than the less
devoted, and in more democratic polities and in polities with more freedom of press, the same is
found for political gender equality. Moreover, support for gender equality is greater in open polities
than closed ones, but this gap closes when people frequent religious services. These results suggest
MENA citizens are not univocally passively socialized by patriarchal religious views, but actively en-
gage with other interpretations, provided these are not banned by oppressive governments.
Introduction
In Western public debates, the Arab Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) is often depicted as a homogen-
ous region in which support for equality between men
and women is virtually non-existent due to Islam (as
also observed by, for instance, Angrist, 2012;
Moghadam, 2013: esp. p. 14–19; C¸avdar and Yas¸ar,
2014). Several quantitative studies echo this view; they
have shown that MENA publics report the world’s
lowest average support for gender equality in the pub-
lic sphere, and attributed this to MENA inhabitants’
patriarchal religious socialization (Norris, 2009; Price,
2016). As scholars have noted (e.g. Said, 1979; Kongar,
Olmsted, and Shehabuddin, 2014; Spierings, 2015;
Alexander and Parhizkari, 2018), this general narrative
implies Orientalism; the MENA is portrayed as one
homogenous bloc—contrary to the progressive, secular
West—inhabited by a passive populace perpetually sub-
jected to patriarchal Islam. These Orientalist views ham-
per nuanced insights in at least three ways; they narrow
religiosity, they confound gender attitudes, and they ig-
nore (political) differences between MENA countries. The
present study adds to the literature by addressing these
three lacunae in its study of polities’ and religiosity’s im-
pact on support for gender equality within the Arab
MENA.
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We address the first lacuna by incorporating more
direct measures of religiosity next to denomination.
Previous quantitative studies have theorized that integra-
tion in patriarchal religions engenders socialization into
oppressive views inducing less support for gender equality,
but most have only empirically addressed denomination,
comparing Muslims to non-Muslims (e.g. Inglehart and
Norris, 2003). This is troublesome, as it is unclear whether
this denominational dichotomy solely reflects religious
integration; for instance, it also completely corresponds
with being a member of the majority versus minority
(Htun and Weldon, 2015; Spierings, 2018). Additionally,
single-country studies have found that different aspects of
religiosity relate to support for gender equality differently,
pressing the need to study multiple and more fine-grained
aspects of religiosity (Meyer, Rizzo and Ali, 1998; Rizzo,
Meyer and Ali, 2002). In this study we tackle religious in-
tegration in a more direct manner by theorizing and testing
the independent impacts of religious belonging (devotion)
and religious behaviour (attending religious services) (see
Kellstedt et al., 1996; Berghammer, 2012).
Second, different aspects of gender equality have
been shown to receive varying support and, theoretical-
ly, the many-sidedness of gender equality may be over-
looked when gender attitudes are lumped together
(Price, 2014; Lussier and Fish, 2016). Still, only a few
existing studies differentiate between different dimen-
sions of gender equality attitudes (e.g., Alexander and
Welzel, 2011; Price, 2014; Kostenko, Kuzmuchev and
Ponarin, 2016). Therefore, we disentangle different
aspects of support for gender equality. As argued from a
gender and Islam studies perspective and elaborated
later, religious integration may affect educational gender
equality differently than political gender equality
(Najmabadi, 1998; Mahmood, 2005). Our first research
question addresses these first two lacunae: To what ex-
tent are religious devotion and religious service attend-
ance related to support for gender equality in education
and in politics in the Arab MENA?
Third, we theorize and study the role of differences
between countries within the Arab MENA. Previous
quantitative studies have mainly studied the MENA
countries as one bloc ‘othered’ against the West, while
regional specialists have mostly focussed on one particu-
lar MENA country, creating little insights into the dif-
ferences between MENA contexts (James-Hawkins,
Qutteina, and Yount, 2016; see Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and
Meyer, 2007; Price, 2016; Alexander and Parhizkari,
2018). As of yet, we thus do not know how to explain
the ‘significant cross-cultural variation in women’s sta-
tus [that] exists within the universe of Muslim-majority
countries’ (Angrist, 2012: p. 52). Next to obfuscating
how MENA contexts directly influence gender equality
attitudes, this is especially troublesome as the relation
between individual religiosity and support for public
gender equality seems to vary across MENA countries.
Indeed, while cross-country studies have largely found
that individual religiosity decreases support for gender
equality, country-specific studies have found insignifi-
cant relations and even higher support for gender equal-
ity among the more religious (e.g. Moaddel, 2006;
Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali, 2007; Alibeli, 2015).
To address these possible contextual differences, the
present study focuses on differences in MENA countries’
polities, as qualitative studies have repeatedly emphasized
their significance but they have been conspicuously absent
in large-scale MENA-specific studies (Owen, 2004;
Charrad, 2011). To illustrate, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan,
and Tunisia have seen democratic currents, gender quotas
in politics, and relatively progressive family laws, while
Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s recent histories are coloured by
Islamism and continued political oppression (Moghadam
and Sadiqi, 2006; Charrad and Zarrugh, 2014; see
Alexander and Apell, 2016 for similar arguments pertain-
ing to Egypt). However, to our knowledge, no existing
quantitative study has systematically addressed how these
varying political structures across MENA countries shape
their publics’ support for gender equality and religiosity’s
impact on gender equality attitudes. Our second research
question thus reads: To what extent are Arab MENA
countries’ polities related to support for gender equality
and to what extent do they moderate religiosity’s impact?
Theoretical Background
Religious Integration
To explain publics’ support for gender equality in
Muslim-majority countries, most previous studies have
proposed a basic socialization perspective (Inglehart and
Norris, 2003; Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Price,
2016). They proposed that people who adhere to an
Islamic denomination are integrated in religious com-
munities that socialize them to reject gender equality
through internalizations of patriarchal views voiced by
for instance parents, teachers, clergy, fellow mosque-
goers, and governments (Al-Hibri, 1982; Lussier and
Fish, 2016). However, existing studies on Kuwait show
that varying dimensions of religion relate to support for
gender equality differently, which implies that multiple
and more direct measures of religiosity are needed
(Meyer, Rizzo and Ali, 1998; Rizzo, Meyer and Ali,
2002). Additionally, adhering to a certain denomination
is a rather obfuscated measure of religious integration
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(Scott, 1998; Berghammer, 2012). As Htun and Weldon
(2015: p. 460) note, ‘it is difficult to attribute causal
power to the doctrines of “Islam,” “Catholicism,” or
“Hinduism.”’ In the Arab MENA, being Muslim or
non-Muslim also completely corresponds with being a
member of the majority or minority, which may relate
to gender equality attitudes via mechanisms besides
religious integration (Mahmood, 2015). Differences in
support for gender equality between Muslims and non-
Muslims may thus reflect religious integration but they
may also reflect other mechanisms, rendering them
difficult to interpret with certainty.
To address religious integration more directly, we
focus on more straightforward features of exposure to
and internalizations of religious norms. First, by fre-
quenting religious services, people are exposed time and
again to dominant patriarchal religious interpretations,
which are expected to be internalized (Voicu, Voicu and
Strapcova, 2009; Moghissi, 2011; Berghammer, 2012;
Halman and Van Ingen, 2015). Second, religious devo-
tion taps into personal internalizations of religious
norms. When people are exposed to religious norms,
the devoted among them are probably more likely to
‘take these norms seriously’ and internalize them more
strongly than the less devoted (Kellstedt et al., 1996).
Non-MENA specific studies provide support for both
relations (Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Lussier and Fish,
2016; Price, 2016); some even demonstrated that devo-
tion’s impact far outweighs denomination’s (Seguino,
2011; Cochrane, 2013). However, almost no compara-
tive studies have systematically addressed these relation-
ships in the MENA, whereas the particularities of the
region do not warrant a simple generalization of this
research. So, our contribution proposes that:
The frequency of religious service attendance (a) and de-
votion (b) are negatively related to support for gender
equality (Hypothesis 1).
We should note here that there is one MENA-specific
study that does address the impact of religious integra-
tion and argues it is gendered (Glas, Spierings, and
Scheepers, 2018). Women would use opportunities to
resist patriarchal views more than men, and these oppor-
tunities would become sparser with greater religious in-
tegration. Their results indeed show that, amongst the
less religious, women are more supportive of gender
equality than men, and that these gender gaps close with
greater service attendance and devotion. However, al-
though the authors show that the strength of the impact
of service attendance and devotion differs for men and
women, it reduces support for gender equality among
both. As religious integration in services and through de-
votion thus works seems to work similarly (although not
equally) for men and women, we leave gendered rela-
tions beyond the scope of our study, although we will of
course ascertain that our conclusions hold for both men
and women.
Different Dimensions of Support for Gender
Equality
The second lacuna of previous studies identified in the
introduction is their lack of attention to different dimen-
sions of gender equality attitudes. However, different
aspects of gender equality receive varying support. In
fact, in one of the few studies that does disaggregate spe-
cific attitudes, Price (2014: p. 372) finds that ‘across the
globe, individuals are much more conservative regarding
women in politics than in higher education’.
Simultaneously, her findings imply that the gap between
support for gender equality in politics and in education
is especially pronounced in Arab countries. We propose
this phenomenon can be explained by religious integra-
tion affecting support for gender equality in education
and in politics differently.
First, mainstream interpretations of Islam particular-
ly emphasize women’s roles as homemakers-caregivers;
Voas, McAndrew, and Storm (2013) propose that ‘[t]he
conservative ethos of religious organizations validates
and reinforces the choice [of a woman] to be a home-
maker’ (p. 264). This seems incongruent with political
gender equality but not necessarily with educational
gender equality (e.g. Tohidi, 2003; Moghadam, 2013;
Ben Shitrit, 2016; Rahimi, 2017). Indeed, while being
active in politics may conflict with motherhood respon-
sibilities, women who attend universities may still be-
come homemakers-caregivers later in life (Najmabadi,
1998; Mahmood, 2005; El Fadl, 2013).
Moreover, religious scriptures also seem to support
education as they consider knowledge a virtue. For in-
stance, the Quran states: ‘Say, “Are those who know
equal to those who do not know?” Truly, only those
endowed with understanding will take heed’. (Quran 9:
39, Khan trans.). Even more clearly, one Sahih (authen-
tic) hadith states: ‘Seeking knowledge is a duty upon
every Muslim’ (Ibn Majah 224, Al-Khattab trans.).
Accordingly and pivotally, regional specialists have
noted that conservative religious interpretations favour
women’s education to shape them into ‘good Muslims’
and ‘good mothers’ (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Elliott, 2015;
Spierings, 2015: p. 135). Already during the 19th cen-
tury, well-known Islamist reformers as Qasim Amin
linked women’s education to the nation’s progress and
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this has been echoed by Islamists especially since the
Islamist revival (Hoffman-Ladd, 1987; Najmabadi,
1998; Khedher, 2017). More recently, Mahmood (2005,
p. 101–102, original emphasis) notes that even in con-
servative women’s piety lessons in Egypt, women’s right
to higher education is presumed, quoting the teacher:
‘God Almighty has informed us that the correct way of
understanding ikhtilat is the abstention from the mixing
of women and men unless by necessity [. . .] Now [the
pursuit of education] is a necessity’. Altogether, we thus
expect that religious integration fuels support for gender
equality, but only in education:
The frequency of religious service attendance (a) and de-
votion (b) are positively related to support for gender
equality in education (Hypothesis 2).
Agency and Polities
To understand differences between MENA countries, we
complement this socialization framework with a focus on
context-dependent agency (Elder, Johnson and Crosnoe,
2003). Context-dependency stresses that people interpret
their lives in virtue of the times and places in which they
live (Spierings, 2016). Likewise, the ability to express
agency, the innate ability to make life choices, can be pro-
moted or prohibited by the context in which people are
embedded (Sewell, 1992; Charrad, 2011). Adding this to
socialization insights creates ‘context-dependent agentic
socialization’; MENA inhabitants are not merely passive-
ly socialized by exposure to patriarchal norms, but are
autonomous beings, who are restrained by their spatio-
temporal contexts but are nevertheless able to deviate
from dominant societal patterns (Spierings, 2015).
The importance of contexts is echoed by case studies
and social movement studies, which have emphasized
polities in particular (Rizzo, Price and Meyer, 2012;
Charrad and Zarrugh, 2014; James-Hawkins, Qutteina,
and Yount, 2016). Building on these insights, we pro-
pose that MENA citizens will internalize support for
gender equality more strongly when they are embedded
in polities that expose them to signals of the equality of
all citizens (Ben Shitrit, 2016). First, democracies signal
equality by ensuring men and women’s equal rights to
participate in electoral processes (Te´treault, Meyer and
Rizzo, 2009). Second, greater freedom of press and
more secular polities reduce restrictions on what views
may be promulgated, leaving more room for liberal voi-
ces (Voicu, Voicu and Strapcova, 2009; Zakarriyya,
2014). Third, more progressive family laws directly sig-
nal gender equality by establishing equal rights for men
and women (Scott, 1998; Htun and Weldon, 2015). All
of these polity characteristics are thus expected to in-
crease the likelihood that publics will internalize liberal
values, inducing greater support for gender equality.
Here, it should be noted that MENA publics who
support gender equality might also choose leaders that
act on their wishes and create more open polities. Still, it
seems questionable that MENA publics’ values have
such a strong influence, for instance, as most polities
clearly restrict the influence of elections and elected poli-
ticians. Accordingly, existing studies have assumed that
MENA countries’ structures shape attitudes rather than
the other way around (Lussier and Fish, 2016; Price,
2016). Additionally, empirical evidence indicates that
the relation at least also runs from structure to attitude,
as MENA publics’ support for gender equality has been
shown to vastly increase after the introduction of quo-
tas, even those implemented following foreign pressures
(Alexander, 2015; Bush and Jamal, 2015). Altogether,
we thus propose that:
Publics in more democratic countries (a), in countries
with greater freedom of press (b), in countries with more
progressive family laws (c), and in more secular coun-
tries (d) are more supportive of gender equality
(Hypothesis 3).
Moving on to agency, MENA countries’ polities are
expected to affect their citizens’ possibilities to actively
deviate from dominant religious interpretations. Polities
or ‘political opportunity structures’ can either reinforce
patriarchal interpretations of religiosity by closing
opportunities to encounter divergent views, or dim
patriarchal interpretations by opening up possibilities to
come across alternative religious interpretations
(Kandiyoti, 1988; Spierings, Smits and Verloo, 2009;
Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010; Abu-Rabia-Queder
and Weiner-Levy, 2013; Halman and Van Ingen, 2015).
First, democracies probably facilitate exercising
agentic deviations from conservative religious interpreta-
tions, as they create public arenas in which citizens can
discuss divergent interpretations (Moghadam and
Gheytanchi, 2010). Similarly, freedom of press probably
enlarges the variation in views people can actively con-
sume creating alleys for more liberal religious thought
(Moghadam and Sadiqi, 2006). Third, as conservative
family laws are a bastion for authoritative religious inter-
pretations of gender relations, more progressive family
laws probably create more freedom for discussions of al-
ternative interpretations (Scott, 1998; Mahmood, 2005;
Htun and Weldon, 2015). Last, following Htun and
Weldon (2015: p. 457), we expect that ‘political institu-
tionalization [of religion] reduces religious pluralism,
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suppressing currents of religious thought that are more
supportive of sex equality’. Secular countries thus prob-
ably open up opportunity structures as they may refrain
from signalling that the only correct religious interpret-
ation is the patriarchal manner in which it is institutional-
ized (Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010).
All in all, we thus expect that more open polities
allow more religious individuals to actively deviate from
patriarchal religious interpretations, while religious citi-
zens in closed polities probably interpret their religion
more conservatively; meanwhile, less religious individu-
als are probably limitedly affected by religion in either
polity, as they are less subjected to religious socialization
in general (Figure 1):
Negative relations between religious service attendance
(a) and devotion (b) and support for public gender
equality are weaker in MENA countries with more open
polities (Hypothesis 4).
Methods & Data
This study uses a subset of the PRiME database, includ-
ing 39 surveys from the two most recent waves of the
Arab Barometer (AB) and the three most recent waves of
the World Values Survey (WVS). Altogether, 14 coun-
tries surveyed between 2001 and 2014 were included,
namely Algeria (4 surveys), Bahrain (1), Egypt (4), Iraq
(5), Jordan (4), Kuwait (1), Lebanon (3), Libya (2),
Morocco (2), Palestine (3), Saudi Arabia (2), Sudan (2),
Tunisia (3), and Yemen (3). All surveys targeted to rep-
resent the entire population of 18 years and older,
employed stratified random or national full probability
sampling, and mostly used face-to-face interviewing.
There is evidence that these data are representative
regarding gender, age, and regional population distribu-
tions for most populations, and educational attainment
for some populations as well.1 The initial data covered
55,211 respondents, and after listwise deletion for miss-
ing values on variables we did not impute (see below),
52,323 respondents remained (94.8 per cent). Table 1
shows the descriptive statistics for all variables.
Support for Gender Equality
Support for gender equality in education was measured
by respondents’ agreement with ‘University education is
more important for a boy than for a girl’. Support for
gender equality in politics was measured by agreement
with ‘On the whole, men make better political leaders
than women do’. Both statements had four answer cate-
gories: ‘strongly agree’ (scored 0), ‘agree’ (33.3), ‘dis-
agree’ (66.7), and ‘strongly disagree’ (scored 100).
Religiosity
Religious service attendance was measured in the AB by
‘Do you attend Friday prayer or Sunday services?’,
‘never’, ‘rarely’ (both scored 0; ‘never’ was only included
in AB 3), ‘sometimes’ (1), ‘most of the time’ (2), or ‘al-
ways’ (3). The WVS asked respondents ‘Apart from wed-
dings and funerals, about how often do you attend
religious services these days?’, ‘never or practically never’,
‘less often’ than once a year, ‘once a year’ (all three scored
0), ‘only on special holy days’ (1), ‘once a month’ (2),
‘once a week’, or ‘more than once a week’ (both scored
3). The values for 1,729 respondents with missing scores
were estimated using per-survey multiple imputations.2
Religious devotion was measured by ‘Would you de-
scribe yourself as. . .’ in both surveys. As answer catego-
ries slightly differed we synchronized the data by
distinguishing between low devotion (0) and high devo-
tion (1), representing ‘not religious’ versus ‘religious’ and
‘somewhat religious’ in the AB data and ‘not a religious
person’ and ‘an atheist’ versus ‘religious’ in the WVS
data.3 The scores of 1, 829 respondents with missing val-
ues were estimated using per-survey multiple imputations.
Polities
Democracy is measured on the survey level using
Freedom House’s seven-point ‘freedom in the world’
scale, ranging from a complete lack of democracy (0) to
complete democracy (6).4 As a robustness check, V-
Dem’s ‘electoral democracy index’ was used.5 Freedom of
press is measured using Freedom House’s ‘press freedom’
scale ranging from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating
greater freedom of press. Progressive family laws could
be measured at the country level using six indicators from
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s Social Institutions & Gender Index,
Figure 1. How polities are expected to moderate religiosity’s
impact on support for gender equality
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics [Nindividual¼ 52,323; Nsurvey¼ 39; Ncountry¼ 14)
N Min Max Mean SD
Dependent variables
Support for gender equality in education 52,323 0 100 62.50 34.90
Support for gender equality in politics 52,323 0 100 28.94 32.04
Religiosity
Religious service attendancea 52,323 0 3 1.75 1.30
Religious devotion
Low devotion 52,323 0 1 0.14
High devotion 52,323 0 1 0.86
Individual-level controls
Denomination
Muslim 52,323 0 1 0.95
Non-Muslim 52,323 0 1 0.05
Sex
Male 52,323 0 1 0.50
Female 52,323 0 1 0.50
Ageb 52,323 18 93 37.57 13.84
Education 52,323 0 3 1.48 1.00
Marital status
Single 52,323 0 1 0.29
Married 52,323 0 1 0.65
Other 52,323 0 1 0.06
Employment status
Full time employed 52,323 0 1 0.30
Part-time employed 52,323 0 1 0.11
Other employed 52,323 0 1 0.05
Retired 52,323 0 1 0.05
Homemaker 52,323 0 1 0.30
Student 52,323 0 1 0.09
Other non-employed 52,323 0 1 0.10
Polities
Democracya 39 0 3.5 1.51 0.82
Freedom of press a 39 13 48 32.21 10.14
Progressive family lawa (country level) 14 0 1 0.25 0.24
Secularisma 39 0 5 2.49 1.38
Contextual-level controls
Survey type
Arab Barometer 39 0 1 0.51
World Values Survey 39 0 1 0.49
Wealthb 39 1350 43332 5448.80 6994.44
Oil rentsb 39 0 63.3 18.79 21.00
Alternative variables for robustness analyses
Support for gender equality in education B
Non-supportive 52,323 0 1 0.32
Supportive 52,323 0 1 0.68
Support for gender equality in politics B
Non-supportive 52,323 0 1 0.75
Supportive 52,323 0 1 0.25
Religious devotion B, WVSa 25,818 0 1 0.96 0.11
Religious service attendance Ba 52,323 0 3 1.57 1.32
aVariable z-scored in analyses.
bVariable rescaled to range from 0 to 1 in analyses.
Source: PRiME 2001–2014.
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namely legal equality concerning: minimum age of mar-
riage, custody rights in marriage and divorce, inheritance
rights of widows and daughters, and freedom of move-
ment.6 The scores were averaged to the scale progressive
family laws, ranging from conservative (0) to progressive
laws (1). Secularism is measured as the absence of state
Islamization using the seven-point scale introduced by
Spierings, Smits, and Verloo (2009), based on content
analyses of the constitutions of MENA countries. Secular
countries score 6, countries that mention Islam as a his-
torical part of the country 5, those depicting Islam as the
state religion while guaranteeing freedom of religion 4,
and next, one point is subtracted for each of the follow-
ing: a country is called an ‘Islamic state’, only Muslims
are eligible to become head of state, all laws are founded
in the Shari’a, and freedom of religion is not guaranteed.
Control Variables
We control for respondents’ denomination, sex, age, edu-
cation, marital status, and employment status.
Respondents’ self-reported denomination distinguishes be-
tween non-Muslims (0) and Muslims (1). Unfortunately,
there are no data available to make further distinctions
within these denominations, but by only distinguishing be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims our results are compar-
able to those of previous studies (e.g. Inglehart and
Norris, 2003; Lussier and Fish, 2016).7 Self-reported sex
distinguishes between men (0) and women (1). We
included respondents’ age at the time of interview and the
quadratic term age2; respondents younger than 18 were
excluded as they were not part of the target population.
Respondents’ highest level of education was measured in
four categories: ‘no complete education’, ‘complete elem-
entary education’, ‘complete secondary education’, and
‘complete tertiary education’. Marital status distinguishes
between ‘single’, ‘married’, and ‘other’. Employment sta-
tus is comprised of seven categories: ‘full time employed’,
‘part-time employed’, ‘other employed’, ‘retired’, ‘home-
maker’, ‘student’, and ‘other non-employed’.
Contextually, we control for wealth (measured as gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita in current US dollars)
and oil rents (as the percentage of GDP).8
Analytic Strategy
The data are analysed using multilevel models to control
for their nested structure (Spierings, 2016). We include
three levels as respondents are nested in country-years,
which are nested in countries (ICCeducational gender equal-
ity¼ 0.07; ICCpolitical gender equality¼ 0.12). As the vari-
ance between countries far outweighs the variance
between years, we consider countries as the highest level
and include temporal changes in the second level.9 All
models allow the impact of service attendance, devotion,
and denomination to differ per survey.
In addition to the main analyses, we performed several
robustness checks. All led to substantially similar results
unless stated otherwise. First, we also ran logistic regres-
sion models on dichotomized versions of our two depend-
ent variables: (0) if they (strongly) agreed that university
education was more important for men or that men made
better political leaders; (1) for who (strongly) disagreed
(1). Second, we reran the models without the multiple
imputations. Third, we used alternative compositions of
our main theoretical variables (Supplementary Appendix
1). Fourth, we reran the models on subsamples (including
per-gender subsamples) (Supplementary Appendices 2 and
3). Fifth, all models including contextual variables were
also estimated excluding outliers: surveys in which (a) con-
textual characteristics or (b) relations between religiosity
and support for gender equality greatly diverged from the
rest of the sample. Some full-sample models turned out to
show misleading results and in those instances we present
the models without outliers and report so in the text.
Sixth and last, we analysed the WVS and AB data
separately. Surprisingly, publics from AB surveys were,
on average, 10 points more supportive of gender equal-
ity on 0 to 100-point scales than publics from WVS sur-
veys, also for publics of the same country surveyed in
the same year. These gaps between AB and WVS surveys
were limitedly explained by about one-third of WVS
respondents not being interviewed in privacy and by
sample differences in education, denomination, and re-
gional distributions.10 Consequently, descriptive statis-
tics should be interpreted with caution and we decided
to control the explanatory models for survey type. This
observation might indicate a serious bias against the
Arab countries when comparing them to countries in
other regions using the WVS data (see for instance
Inglehart and Norris, 2003)— and warrant future atten-
tion of researchers. We, however, stress that relations
between religiosity and support for gender equality—the
main focus in this paper—were substantially similar in
the subsamples by survey type (see Supplementary
Appendix 4). Although differences between AB and
WVS surveys are thus striking, they do not lead to diver-
gent conclusions regarding our research questions.
Results
Descriptive Analyses
Figure 2 shows average levels of support for gender
equality in surveys and countries across years.11 MENA
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publics support gender equality in education more than
twice as much as gender equality in politics (63 versus
29) (cf. Price, 2014). As expected, women’s roles that do
not necessarily counter homemaker-caregiver norms
(education) thus receive greater support than those that
do (being active in politics). More generally, these find-
ings underline the importance of distinguishing between
different dimensions of support for gender equality ra-
ther than assuming that support for one dimension of
gender equality will simply translate into support for
another.
Figure 2 also shows substantial differences between
countries within the Arab MENA, which indicates the im-
portance of not homogenizing different MENA countries
to one bloc. On average, Lebanese, Algerian, and Tunisian
publics are most supportive of gender equality in the pub-
lic sphere, while Iraqi, Saudi, Sudanese, and Yemeni pub-
lics are most hesitant. Thus, as expected, the highest levels
of support for gender equality are found in relatively open
polities, while the lowest are found in closed polities.
Explanatory Analyses
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 assess how individual religios-
ity relates to support for gender equality in education and
politics respectively (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Models 3
through 10 in Table 3 address whether MENA countries’
polities fuel their publics’ support for gender equality
(Hypothesis 3) and whether they moderate religiosity’s
impact (Hypothesis 4). All models include the control
variables, which relate to support for gender equality as
expected; for instance, women are more supportive of
gender equality in education and politics than men. Also,
in line with previous studies, Muslims are less supportive
than non-Muslims, although, as stated, the mechanism
behind this relationship is difficult to assert.12
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 probe the impact of reli-
gious integration and first show that more frequent at-
tendance of religious services significantly lowers
support for gender equality in both education and polit-
ics. These findings support Hypothesis 1a and refute
Hypothesis 2a; it seems that MENA citizens are exposed
to and internalize patriarchal values in religious services.
Similarly, the more devoted are found to be significantly
less supportive of gender equality in politics, providing
support for Hypothesis 1b.
Strikingly however, religiously devoted MENA citi-
zens are significantly more supportive of gender equality
in education than the less devoted. This supports
Hypothesis 2b; devoted MENA inhabitants actually sup-
port women’s equal right to a university education more
than the less devoted, which may, for instance, reflect
beliefs that education prepares women for motherhood.
More generally, it seems that MENA citizens’ personal
religious interpretations do not necessarily block sup-
port for gender equality; it is rather exposure to religious
authorities’ (patriarchal) messages that does so.
Contextual Differences
Models 3 through 10 in Table 3 show that MENA pub-
lics are significantly more supportive of gender equality
Figure 2.Mean support for educational and political gender equality per survey (N¼ 39).
Source: PRiME 2001–2014.
306 European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 35, No. 3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/article-abstract/35/3/299/5316428 by guest on 17 April 2020
in education and politics in countries and years with
higher levels of democracy (Model 3 and 4), greater free-
dom of press (Model 5 and 6), more progressive family
laws (Model 7 and 8), and greater secularism (Model 9
and 10).13 These findings indicate that publics of more
open polities internalize their signals of gender equality,
which supports Hypothesis 3.
Do these open polities also moderate religiosity’s im-
pact on gender equality attitudes? Starting with the im-
pact of attendance, Table 3 shows that its relations to
support for gender equality are indeed altered in more
democratic countries, countries with greater freedom of
press, and more secular countries, but not in the
expected direction. Religious service attendance is more
strongly negatively related to support for gender equal-
ity in these more open polities.14 For instance, as Figure
3 illustrates, attending religious services more strongly
reduces support for educational gender equality if coun-
tries have more progressive family laws.15 Thus, al-
though support for gender equality amongst frequent
service attendees is larger in open countries than in
closed ones, the impact of attending services is larger in
these countries. Vice versa, attending religious services
has less impact in less open countries, where people are
more opposed to gender equality in general. The excep-
tion to this pattern is that the relation between religious
Table 2.Multilevel analyses of support for gender equality (N¼ 52,323)
Model 1 Model 2
Education Politics
b SE b SE
Individual religiosity
Religious service attendance 1.08* 0.31 1.35* 0.38
Devotion (ref.¼ low)
Highly devoted 1.37* 0.61 1.31* 0.75
Controls
Denomination (ref.¼ non-Muslim)
Muslim 5.49* 0.80 9.81* 1.71
Sex (ref.¼male)
Female 12.42* 0.41 12.31* 0.36
Age 4.74 5.10 3.79 4.54
Age2 3.21 6.36 3.37 5.67
Education 4.37* 0.17 1.53* 0.15
Marital status (ref.¼ single)
Married 0.89* 0.44 0.46 0.40
Other 0.78 0.76 0.30 0.68
Employment status (ref.¼ fulltime)
Part-time 1.65* 0.52 0.02 0.47
Other employed 4.93* 0.72 1.02 0.64
Retired 0.64 0.77 0.17 0.69
Homemaker 4.04* 0.51 4.13* 0.46
Student 0.95 0.65 0.08 0.58
Other non-employed 3.06* 0.56 0.14 0.50
Survey type (ref.¼AB)
WVS survey 10.31* 2.38 9.62* 2.91
Intercept 59.55* 1.97 38.23* 2.67
Variances
Intercept 65.86 118.47
Muslim 0.18 40.35
Highly devoted 4.87 12.84
Service attendance 2.54 4.74
Residual 1076.8 854.7
Note: *P<0.05.
Source: PRiME (AB and WVS) 2001-2014.
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service attendance and support for political gender
equality is weaker in secular countries (see Figure 4).
Still, in general Hypothesis 4a has to be rejected. Rather
than cushioning patriarchal messages preached in serv-
ices, open polities reinforce their importance, because in
open polities the openness of the system is used in par-
ticular by the people exposed least to patriarchal doc-
trines; particularly the least frequent attendees consume
alternative views on gender equality given the
opportunity.
Regarding devotion, our models show that the posi-
tive relation with gender equality in education remains
unaltered in countries with greater freedom of press,
countries with more progressive family laws, and more
secular countries. We only find a significant moderation
in democratic polities, where the positive impact of de-
votion is slightly weaker. Hypothesis 4 b is thus mainly
refuted for educational gender equality. The religiously
devoted support gender equality in education more than
the less devoted, mostly regardless of in which polity
they are embedded.
Interestingly however, devotion’s impact on polit-
ical gender equality is moderated by the openness of
countries’ polities. We find that negative relations be-
tween devotion and support for gender equality in pol-
itics are weaker in more open polities, which supports
Figure 3. Service attendance and support for gender equality by countries’ family laws (N¼ 14).
Source: PRiME 2001–2014.
Figure 4. Religious service attendance and support for gender equality by secularism (N¼ 38).
Source: PRiME 2001–2014.
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Hypothesis 4 b. Even more strikingly, in democracies
and countries with large freedom of press, devotion ac-
tually increases support for gender equality in politics
(see Figure 5).16 The more devoted are thus more sup-
portive of gender equality in politics than the less
devoted in these countries. Echoing our findings con-
cerning educational gender equality, being religiously
devoted thus does not per se diminish support for gen-
der equality in the MENA; religious devotion fuels sup-
port for educational gender equality and, under certain
conditions, for political gender equality as well.
Conclusions and Discussion
This contribution addressed relations between religiosity
and support for public-sphere gender equality in Arab
Middle Eastern and North African countries. Previous
quantitative studies have generally proposed that integra-
tion in patriarchal religions diminishes MENA citizens’
support for gender equality, and have shown that
Muslims on average support gender equality less than
non-Muslims (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Price, 2016).
That existing line of research lacks nuance as it concludes
the ubiquity of patriarchal religious socialization in the
MENA without paying attention to (a) denomination
only opaquely reflecting religious integration, (b) the
many-sidedness of gender equality attitudes, and (c) the
vast variations in MENA countries’ polities, which may
influence both support for gender equality and religios-
ity’s impact thereon. We addressed these three lacunae by
applying a new nuanced socialization framework, ‘con-
text-dependent agentic socialization’; MENA citizens are
not unidimensionally or solely passively socialized to
oppose gender equality, but can actively engage more pro-
gressive religious interpretations, provided their countries’
political systems do not singularly suppress alternative
views. We tested our framework using WVS and AB data
that include over 50,000 respondents in almost forty
MENA contexts and multilevel analyses.
Our results first showed patriarchal socialization
through religious integration does exist to some extent.
MENA citizens who frequently attend religious services
were found to be less supportive of gender equality.
Also, the religiously devoted were less supportive of pol-
itical gender equality than the less devoted, but as shown
later this does not hold across countries. Exposure to
and internalizations of (patriarchal) religious messages
thus do lower support for gender equality.
However, disentangling different aspects of religios-
ity and support for gender equality also showed that
patriarchal religious socialization was not omnipresent
(cf. Norris, 2009; Price, 2016; Alexander and
Parhizkari, 2018). First, MENA citizens do not reject all
aspects of gender equality equally. In line with Price’s
(2014) findings, support for gender equality in education
was twice as large as support for political gender equal-
ity, which is in line with our expectations as being active
in politics more clearly contradicts motherhood roles
(Najmabadi, 1998; Mahmood, 2005). Even more strik-
ingly, while exposure to authorities’ religious interpreta-
tions was consistently found to reduce support for
gender equality, personal religious devotion also seems
to fuel support for gender equality (cf. Voicu, Voicu and
Strapcova, 2009; Berghammer, 2012). The devoted
were more, not less, supportive of gender equality in
education. Probably, this reflects religiously-inspired
Figure 5. Devotion and support for political gender equality by level of democracy (N¼ 39).
Source: PRiME 2001–2014.
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views that education shapes women to become ‘good
mothers’ and ‘good Muslims’ (Abu-Lughod, 1998;
Elliott, 2015; Spierings, 2015: p. 135).
Devotion’s positive impact was emphasized again
when we took differences between MENA countries’
polities into account. Negative relations between devo-
tion and support for political gender equality were
weaker in more open polities. In fact, in countries that
establish freer public arenas – more democratic MENA
countries and those with larger freedom of press – the
devoted support gender equality in politics more than
the less devoted. In line with our context-dependent
agentic-socialization framework, MENA inhabitants are
thus not solely passively socialized by patriarchal reli-
gious views, but also engage other interpretations, pro-
vided these are not suppressed by oppressive
governments.
This does not mean that all aspects of religious inte-
gration lose importance in MENA countries with more
open polities. Religious service attendance was generally
more strongly associated with opposition to gender
equality in more democratic countries, countries with
greater freedom of press and countries with more pro-
gressive family laws. Nevertheless, as expected, the gen-
eral as well as the most religious populations in those
countries were still more supportive of gender equality
than in conservative countries (Halman and Van Ingen,
2015; Htun and Weldon, 2015; Ben Shitrit, 2016). It
thus seems that while open polities allow more room for
alternative views and support for gender equality, as we
expected, this room is not mainly used by service-goers
but rather by non-frequent attendees. In the case of reli-
gious service attendance, the less religious rather than
the more religious use spaces to deviate from dominant
patriarchal norms. All in all, in relatively progressive
countries, houses of worship thus seem to be one of the
few remaining bulwarks of patriarchal religious views,
reinforcing their importance amongst those who attend
them, whereas their traditional messages are more omni-
present in closed societies, leading to less additional im-
pact of attendance (Al-Hibri, 1982; Kucinskas, 2010; cf.
Scott, 1998).
Future research can further illuminate our findings
by more directly addressing the existence of free public
arenas, for instance, by focussing on feminist and reli-
gious movements (see Htun and Weldon, 2012). Our
measures were rather higher-level top-down, which con-
founds exactly why the impact of religiosity is more
clearly altered in some polities than in others.
Additionally, future studies could also assess whether
polities’ alterations of the impact of religion is also gen-
dered. Relatedly, if cross-national panel data become
available, future research should address in more detail
to which extent MENA countries’ polities shape gender
equality attitudes and to which extent attitudes shape
polities.
Religious forces could also be further disentangled
from non-religious ones. Future research could explain
why Muslims support gender equality less than non-
Muslims even after religious socialization has been
addressed. Similarly, the impact of power relations be-
tween governments and religious authorities could be
studied further. Rulers in Islamist MENA countries
might try to increase their legitimacy by monitoring reli-
gious institutions, influencing clergy to preach in favour
of the political status quo and against political gender
equality (Angrist, 2012; Moghadam, 2013; Zakarriya,
2014; Htun and Weldon, 2015). This would explain
why the impact of attending religious services on polit-
ical gender equality was not cushioned by democracies,
freedom of press, or progressive family laws, but it was
by secularism. However, this remains a question for fu-
ture research to address.
These limitations notwithstanding, to our know-
ledge, the present study is the first of its kind to system-
atically disentangle how religiosity relates to different
facets of support for public-sphere gender equality and
in which MENA polities. Religiosity not only impedes
the development of gender equality attitudes, but given
the right political opportunity structures religious devo-
tion actually serves as a motor of gender equality.
Notes
1 The comparability of these data is discussed in the
Results section. Http://www.arabbarometer.org/
and http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
2 To test robustness to synchronizations of the two
surveys types, we also recoded the WVS into ‘al-
ways’ (3), ‘once a week’ (2), ‘once a month’ (1) and
0 for other answers, which, combined with AB
measures, created religious service attendance B.
For the main analyses we chose the first operation-
alization as it leads to the most similar attendance
figures for AB and WVS surveys of the same coun-
try and year.
3 Religious devotion B averages WVS scores ‘How
important is God in your life?’ (ten-point scale,
ranging from 0 to 1) and ‘How important in your
life would you say is religiosity?’ (four-point scale,
from 0 to 1).
4 Www.freedomhouse.org. If scores in a year were
missing, we averaged scores of the previous and the
following year.
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5 The results were substantially similar. https://www.
v-dem.net/en/.
6 Http://www.genderindex.org/data/.
7 Denominations of Yemeni respondents from AB 2
were unavailable, but as virtually all Yemenis are
Muslims (99.8 to 100.0 percent in other surveyed
years), they were all considered Muslim. Likewise,
Bahraini respondents’ denomination was not included
in WVS 6, so all who were born in Bahrain and held
citizenship were considered Muslims, and others,
who could be Muslim or non-Muslim migrants, were
excluded. We also established that our results were
substantially similar when Lebanon was excluded.
8 Data.worldbank.org. Libya’s 2014 wealth and oil
rents were substituted by 2011 numbers.
9 ANOVAs’ F-values for seven countries surveyed in
AB 2, AB 3, and WVS 6 between years were 5 to 35
(save Algeria), and between countries 28 to 130
concerning educational gender equality; F-values of
political gender equality between years were 1 to
39 and between countries 68 to 135.
10 When we exclude WVS respondents who were not
interviewed in complete privacy, we find substan-
tially similar results however (see Models R8 in
Appendices 2 and 3).
11 These results hold when survey type differences are
considered.
12 Relations between denomination and support for
gender equality are slightly stronger when religious
service attendance and devotion are added to the
model (cf. Appendix 1). This indicates that denomi-
nation’s impact is not explained by religiosity, al-
though this is not our main focus and should be
addressed in future studies.
13 P-values for all contextual relations were estimated
using likelihood ratio tests. Models without moder-
ations (Appendix 1) show similar results. Additional
analyses including moderations between polities and
gender show that the gender gap in support for polit-
ical gender equality significantly increases (P<0.05)
in more democratic countries, countries with more
freedom of press, and countries with more progres-
sive family laws. No significant moderations by
gender are found for educational gender equality.
14 The moderation between service attendance and dem-
ocracy concerning educational gender equality is rela-
tively unstable and is non-significant in the Varieties
of Democracy operationalization. Furthermore, per-
gender subsamples show the same moderating pat-
terns of polities and religious service attendance in all
cases except one, but in that case the moderation
does not reach statistical significance. (Amongst men,
the negative relation between service attendance and
political gender equality is non-significantly weak-
ened in more democratic countries.)
15 Figures 3, 4, and 5 show net relations for Muslims
and Figures 3 and 5 focus on devoted Muslims. We
find similar patterns when we exclude contexts
with the most open polities.
16 To reiterate, we also find the devoted are more sup-
portive of political gender equality than the less
devoted in democracies when we operationalize
democracies using V-dem’s electoral democracy
index. In per-gender subsamples, all moderations
between devotion and gender equality show the
same patterns, except two, but these are neverthe-
less non-significant in both our main analyses and
in our sub-samples. (Amongst men, the negative re-
lation between devotion and political gender equal-
ity is non-significantly stronger in more secular
countries. Amongst women, the positive relation
between devotion and educational gender equality
is non-significantly weaker in countries with more
progressive family laws.)
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